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and all services will be networked. This future military will be able to mobilize and regenerate for the unknown future while preserving our national industrial base and will be led by a volunteer force led by combat veterans amongst the officers and NCOs. 1 In light of the resource context in which these remarks were delivered, this was a remarkably ambitious and optimistic statement about the future of the U.S. and nation building operations. Simultaneously, the Army is trying to develop the future Operational Environment (OE), full of uncertainty and complexity has decided to retain the ability to conduct full spectrum operations, through decisive action.
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Based on current and projected budget cuts to defense spending, reductions in resources will impact the Army's ability to man, equip, modernize, and train the force.
An unwritten element of the code of the professional military is that we do the best we can with what we are given. Yet at some point, even for the most creative and adaptive organizations, -financial gravity‖ takes hold. You cannot fire rounds you do not have; you cannot send officers to courses that don't exist; you cannot drive vehicles that were not built. -Doing more with less‖ becomes -Doing the same with less‖ and, eventually, -Doing less with less.‖ This paper does not claim to know where those inflection points occur. But it does explore how our current orientation towards future strategic preparedness (which right now is summarized as -doing the same with less‖) may be misleading and potentially destructive to the force.
Looking to a future OE characterized by increasing uncertainty, rapid change, and a wide variety of adversaries, the Army must evaluate the risk associated with its future mission requirements. Since World War II (WWII), the evolution of the strategic posture of the military can be described as a series of decisions as to what we will and will not do. In a sense, the recent statements of senior military leaders and new strategic documents fit neatly into the post-WWII tradition of the -wills‖ and -won'ts‖ of American military strategy. This evaluation is based on available and projected resources, defined strategy, and current and potential adversaries. 3 The military surveys the environment, identifies likely strategic needs and risks, and seeks the capabilities that match those needs and risks.
Yet we have an equally consistent tradition of following up such assertions with deployments in contingency operations that almost always fall into the -won't‖ category.
In a speech at West Point, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates summed this up nicely:
Just think about the range of security challenges we face right now beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: terrorism and terrorists in search of weapons of mass destruction, Iran, North Korea, military modernization programs in Russia and China, failed and failing states, revolution in the Middle East, cyber, piracy, proliferation, natural and man-made disasters, and more. And I must tell you, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and morewe had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged. 4 (We could add Korea to that list-and Vietnam, as well, if we push out the year anticipation.) Yet the idea that -we have never once gotten it right‖ is not reflected in our approach to future capabilities. We continue to try to define the future and develop capabilities to match the future we envision. This approach is -Static CapabilitySeeking.‖ It has not worked for us in the past, and everything about the current and emerging environment suggests that it will not work any better in the future. Why do we continue to do it? This paper suggests that this ongoing error is rooted in a fundamentally flawed approach to risk-our calculus is distorted by availability and confirmation biases, and by a focus on the worst-case scenario.
Some fundamental truths regarding the strategic environment suggest that static capability-seeking is not the optimal approach. First, despite our best efforts to define away certain responsibilities, civilian leaders determine what missions are worth American blood and treasure. The military advises, but the political leaders decide.
Second, the U.S. military does not choose its wars. As we like to put it, -the enemy has a vote.‖ Indeed, the enemy, being a generally astute species (Saddam Hussein excepted), is likely to choose fights in which he has a chance of success. He will be more confident to risk conflict with the U.S. when he knows the U.S. is reluctant to commit forces, or when U.S. doctrine and training is a poor fit for the conflict environment. Third, history suggests that it is not merely possible that the military will be required to fight a war for which it is ill-prepared, it is likely, for the two reasons mentioned above. Static capability-seeking, far from preparing us for conflict, is part of the calculus that creates the conditions for contingency conflicts.
Recognizing these facts, this paper proposes a dynamic approach to building capabilities in the Army: dynamic capability-seeking. Dynamic capabilities are the organizational ability to develop new capabilities effectively and quickly. Instead of relying upon a non-existent certainty in the future, dynamic capability-seeking rests on an acceptance of the fundamental uncertainty of the future strategic environment. It orients organizational resources toward building the capability to learn, to adapt, and rapidly to develop and field materiel. It also requires the ability to scale rapidly certain key, static capabilities that must be retained. (For example, certain large acquisitions programs must be maintained at minimum levels of production to allow continuing improvements and provide a basis for future, contingent expansion.)
The following section reviews the static capability-seeking concept of strategy. By reviewing one prominent debate in the conventional approach to strategic capabilities Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) vs. Wide Area Security (WAS), it seeks to illustrate the fundamental weaknesses of this approach. Then it examines the potential for a different strategic orientation: dynamic capability-seeking. This rests on mutually supporting investments in training, doctrine, and a more nimble acquisitions system.
Static Capabilities: Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security
The Army has defined Decisive Action through the application of CAM and WAS as the core competencies necessary to achieve this goal. 5 The Army's defines CAM and WAS as follows:
CAM is the application of the elements of combat power in a complimentary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action and exploit success.
WAS is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to develop the situation through action, gain or maintain contact with the enemy, and to deny the enemy positions of advantage. The intent is to protect forces, populations, infrastructure, activities and consolidate tactical operations gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and political goals. 6 The Army articulates within its unified land operations document the ability to conduct decisive actions, through offense, defense, stability and Direct Support Civilian Authority (DSCA) relying on CAM and WAS. Given the budgetary constraints and associated resource reductions facing the Army, is it realistic to expect it to maintain equal proficiency in both core competencies? Given the current and projected future constraints, can the Army do everything simultaneously? It is not at all clear. Obviously, the desire to be good at both reflects some fundamental uncertainty about future requirements. Given the choice between being good at A and being good at B, we choose being good at both. But the Army's history (as mentioned above) and research on how people conceptualize risk both suggest that the Army is likely to fail in this effort.
If there is no clearly stated prioritization to direct the focus of the limited resources, the Army will default to one core competency over the other. This results from problems with the way we (human beings) tend to think about risk, to which we now turn. advance these views are well-intentioned, but they are limited by how they view risk.
The Army defines risk as a manifestation of a possible loss or negative impact that can be stated in terms of probability and severity or actions that otherwise impacts mission effectiveness. 7 If the assessment of risk is strictly evaluated in terms of the likelihood of an event occurring against the judged consequence, this approach is subjective in assessment rather than quantifiable. There are other variables in gauging risk that leaders must consider when evaluating probability, availability, and the cost of loss. To evaluate risk the Army needs to be cognizant of a variety of humanistic, cultural and psychological biases that will distort risk assessment. We focus on three:
confirmation, availability, and affect biases. They distort how we receive, process, and analyze context to create an assessment of risk.
Psychologists have identified two modes of thinking that frame biases; an automatic system and an effortful system. The first system operates automatically and rapidly with minimal control. Examples are judging the distance of two objects, detecting emotional state (happy, sad, mad) looking at a person's face or driving a vehicle on an empty road. The effortful system forces attention on mental activities that include computation, or an experience that requires choice and concentration. Examples of the effortful system are monitoring personal behavior in social settings, assessing the validity of a complex logical argument, and completing a student loan form. 8 The effortful system requires attention and is disrupted when your attention is shifted away for any portion of time on another target. The automatic system is constantly feeding data and suggestions to the effortful system, such as impressions, intuitions, intentions and feelings. Once the effortful system has received this input, if it accepts them, then those intuitions and impressions convert into beliefs and can further develop into voluntary actions. 9 In some instances, issues arise with the automatic system, possessing little capability for logic and statistics, cannot be disengaged. These actions can cause the effortful system to generate errors based on an inability to identify the available error.
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These two systems interaction with confirmation, availability, and affect (or worst-case scenario analysis) biases can effectively blind people based on their intensity even when other events are present, and directly affect risk assessment.
Confirmation Bias. Any assessment of risk must be wary of confirmation basis when formulating a decision. Confirmation bias causes us to seek supportive data, arguments, or scenarios to use as confirming evidence which can be explained as a positive test strategy. The belief in a system or sympathy for a particular concept can cause us to act upon it even when it is not valid, or the opposite, dismiss everything else. If one gathers enough data in support for a particular case, the probability of occurrence in that person or groups minds becomes greater. The probability to overestimate the event's occurrence, impact, or cost will also become greater. The less evidence we have, the greater the likelihood that the evidence we draw upon to shape our theories and expectations for future conflict will not fit the threat that actually emerges.
Affect Bias, or Worst-Case Analysis. The final bias we explore is affect bias, which is the distortion in judgment created by the organization or leader's protective actions in response to the risk of the worst case or highest cost outcome. The inclination to forecast the worst case scenario and the associated risk, coupled with a negative emotional reaction to the outcomes will heighten or exacerbate the affect. This will, when connected to different scenarios or OEs, create an improbably high negative reference between the worst case and various alternatives. This imbalance changes the risk calculus and influences the final decision. The decision, therefore, will be driven by the inference that the cost is high even if the probability is very low. 16 In the discussion below, we return to how worst case forecasting may distort the current strategic debate. We do not suggest that such analysis should not be a part of strategic decision-making. Yet worst-case analysis without sufficient regard to probability will cripple an organization's broader capabilities. A U.S. military solely geared to winning an all-out war with China will, due to resource constraints, have no latitude for developing capabilities necessary in the more likely event of, say, stability operations in Africa.
The ability of an organization to assess more accurately probability, availability, and affect are critical components of evaluating risk. This evaluation of risk will influence decisions made in priorities, resources, proficiency and Army core competencies. The organization must be aware of biases or heuristic tendencies that can further influence the decision making process by affecting intuition, judgment and emotion. The current approach is inherently flawed, and these biases allow knowledgeable people to make mistakes in calculating risk assessment.
Assumptions of Static Capability-Seeking. The new Department of Defense
(DoD) strategic defense guidance and strategy direct the Army's core competencies and capabilities. All strategy requires assumptions. The difficulty resides in getting the assumption right or eliminating as much of an error as possible and then making the decision. The assumptions used in refining military strategy influence the Army's structure, manning and modernization to achieve objectives based on available and potential resources allocated against required priorities.
Debate on Army Capabilities: Biases at Work. Four key assumptions underlie the current strategic debate. First, the military does not choose its conflicts; for example, the need to pursue both CAM and WAS capabilities is justified by a fundamental uncertainty regarding future mission requirements. Second, the military can learn quickly; it will acquire new capabilities through organizational adaptation. Third, the reduced resource environment requires some decisions now regarding investment in future capabilities;
we do not have the resources to be good at everything, so we must choose what to be good at now, and what to learn later, if necessary. Fourth, the nation will resource the military's required capabilities to achieve the directed strategy; strategy drives resources. Each of these assumptions is evident in the latest U.S. strategic doctrine.
Yet in some cases, they are at odds with each other. For example, the stated desire for multiple capabilities (because of assumption 1) conflicts with the organization's tendency to commit to a narrow set of capabilities (assumption 3 Another author that echoes this argument is Dr. Collin Gray. He argues that war (and by war, he means big war) is a human condition and civilization will not see the conclusion of warfare in the 21st century. Warfare is, at its center, fighting-both regular and irregular styles. Given that both types will occur, the U.S. military should spend its energy and resources focused on inter-state war fighting capabilities as its first priority. 19 The future conflicts the U.S. will be engaged in will carry a variety of unknowns. To have a capability that can react to and overcome that uncertainty must, be robust. 20 The
Army, as part of the military strategy, must initially deter, and if required, defeat any nation state or combination of nations that endanger our regional interests. The Army would do this by creating, and maintaining our preeminence in conventional combat, now categorized by the Army as CAM. 21 Gentile and Grey both maintain that the Army must return to more primary conventional war fighting capabilities regarding Combined Arms Maneuver.
Both COL Gentile and Dr. Grey build their arguments around the four assumptions described above. The strength of their argument is the degree to which it acknowledges the fundamental uncertainty of future conflict (assumption 1 The affect (worst-case) bias also colors Gentile's and Grey's analyses. Without strong overwhelming conventional capabilities in a future environment, they argue, the Army will suffer catastrophic consequences. This discussion is based on a worst case belief, where extreme events have very high consequences and outcomes are often judged to exceed the perceived scenario. If this affect becomes the dominate paradigm regarding future military action, it limits our ability to see more than one significant threat. Emotional connection to the outcome will directly impact decisions and priorities from the associated fear. Additionally, the uncertainty of the worst case scenario can influence public opinion and direct political decisions through loss aversion even when there is less probability of the event. It means that the Army is embracing a strategic perspective that places the organization at greater risk of operational failure. Our commitment to CAM, in the absence of a stronger commitment to organizational dynamic capabilities (more on this below), is not going to result in a nimble, adaptive force. It will result in a force that has great difficulty adapting to the requirements of the combat environments to which it is most likely to be deployed.
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John A. Nagl offers a different opinion on the Army's focus from Gray and Gentile. To some extent, Nagl rejects the assumption that the military can learn and adapt. His premise is that the Army must create an organizational structure based on current evolving tactics and future OEs. The Army must not rebuild its capabilities exclusively around combined arms maneuver for the sole purpose of achieving decisive operations and tactical victories within the future environment. 28 The adversaries that we have faced and those that observed our militaries actions over the Additionally, Nagl states that we choose certain types of Military operations and remain fixated on conventional capabilities. The Army's ability to adapt to the context of the OE is limited, and the military needs to structure organizations to confront future challenges. The future challenges the Army will face are not confined to the composition of the future adversary or resources alone. When analyzing a whole systems belief, the defense institution in some aspects remains severely vested in a practice that continues to prioritize the required resources and organization necessary for a more conventional nation state conflict. 30 Contrary to that view of inflexibility, the U.S. military has adapted to the changing environment repeatedly. Our civilian leaders use the military in a wide variety of situations to achieve strategic objectives. During a significant portion of the past 67 years, the military has evolved through WAS operations and nation building, this experience, started at the conclusion of WWII. The defeat of Germany and Japan were the first experiences with WAS, and the military was used to achieve comprehensive efforts at social, political and economic reestablishment. These actions were also an undertaking to convey and progress democracy in these nations during post conflict settings. These operations occurred between 1945-1952, with the peak of the forces in Germany at 1.6 million soldiers, and within Japan, the high point was 350 thousand soldiers. 31 During the 1990's, the military was involved in a number of operations beginning with Somalia from 1992-1994, to assist with humanitarian relief efforts. The U.S. troop numbers peaked during operations in Somalia at 28,000 soldiers. 32 The Somalia mission was followed over the next 10 years, with missions in Haiti (1994 Haiti ( -1995 requiring 21,000 soldiers, Bosnia (1995-2004) 20,000 soldiers, and Kosovo (1999-Present) 15,000 soldiers. 33 Our involvement in Vietnam started through Special Forces counterinsurgency assistance and stabilization operations from December 1960 through June 1965. 34 The latest examples of sustained WAS operations are evident in the past 10 plus years in Iraq, and Afghanistan. All of these examples presented similar challenges in terms of security and security force training, humanitarian needs, civil administration or support of existing agencies, economic challenges and reconstruction. 35 These examples also highlight that WAS operations are complex and time consuming, requiring prolonged time, financial resources and military manpower to achieve the desired effect. Additionally, in most instances, the analysis of these operations highlight that the larger military stabilization presence, the lower the troop casualties. 36 When called upon, the Army executes the mission asked of it. The past 67 years demonstrate that both CAM and WAS have been required, with a lot more of the latter.
The Army does not choose the conflicts it enters because civilian leadership makes those decisions. The military retains flexibility and adaptability to adjust to the OE, the concern is founded in the required time to focus its capabilities correctly.
Before we turn to the discussion of dynamic capabilities, the final strategic assumption-that strategy drives resources-must be addressed. We assume that we will appropriately resource the capabilities the Army needs to execute its mission.
Gentile, Grey and Nagl assume are that the nation will resource the strategy decided on to ensure successful implementation. Reviewing current budget reduction impacts on manning, equipping and modernizing Army capabilities suggest a different reality.
Strategy drives resources, but the reverse is also true: resources drive strategy. When resources are plentiful, the -tail‖ of resources is less likely to wag the -dog‖ of strategybecause the military is able to resource multiple strategies to a higher degree of proficiency. But when resources are constrained, programs are cut, reduced, delayed, etc., and these changes are not always made with reference to specific changes in requirements. Indeed, there is a long list of acquisitions programs that died despite the which for FY12 will total 65.5 billion dollars. 40 DoD stated that they will avoid a hallow force and focus on a smaller ground force fully prepared to fight and execute its mission, while preserving the industrial base. The places where the Army has the most flexibility to absorb these possible future sequestration reductions are 1) personnel manning levels, 2) maintaining equipment and training, and 3) acquisitions.
The budget reduction will impact the manpower force structure of the Army. The Army's current active operational strength is approximately 570,000 soldiers. The monetary funding for military personnel pay coupled with civilian and contractor pay accounts for about 121 billion dollars, approx 58%, of the total 208 billion requested.
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Support of the manpower portion of this budget is appropriated to areas such as health care, military pay, housing allotment, childcare, family services, retention and manning initiatives to illustrate just a few of the categories. 42 The worst case reduction to the approximately 31.9 billion dollars during the FY12 budget request. 45 The Army has allocated 9.2 billion towards procurement in the next fiscal year of that total; 3.9 billion is focused on aviation capabilities and 1.6 billion on ground combat vehicles and the Stryker vehicle. 46 The Army will reduce the overall number of platforms and quantity of systems needed as the force is downsized. The acquisition process will also increase in time spreading out the duration of the costs. The need to reduce spending has and will continue, if sequestration occurs to cause the Army to save in areas where operating costs are the highest. This will directly affects its modernization program for the Abrams;
Bradley, Field Artillery, Warfighting Information Network, and required intelligence platforms to highlight just a few. 47 The Army will not have enough forces to do everything required for CAM and WAS nor will they have every required system. Command (TRADOC) highlighted in TRADOC PAM 525-3-6 that in the case of IBCTs, these organizations lack the mobility requirement within their current structure to conduct WAS missions. 49 While it notes mobility specifically, there are other nested components that require consideration. Associated with increased mobility (vehicles) comes the need for assigned communications platforms, Blue Force Trackers (FBCB2)
for vehicles and assigned weapons systems for each vehicle to highlight just a few shortages necessary to make BCTs fully capable. Reduced funding in procurement directly affects the Army's ability to replace or provided this equipment. With the addition of the aforementioned systems, Army units would also incur increased maintenance costs, fuel costs, ammunition for qualification and training costs. These units also need the equipment to train with prior to being asked to conduct the mission assigned.
Budget constraints impact where to focus modernization, the quantity available, which directly affects your capabilities, and in turn, influences the decision making process.
The final area concerns required operation and maintenance costs for the future force structure. The conflict in Afghanistan is ongoing, and the final combat troops left
Iraq at the end of December 2011. One of the possible consequences of future sequestration reductions is the discontinuing of OCO funding. As both of these conflicts conclude, the requirement to replace and repair equipment is a residual cost that impacts the monetary resources available to the Army. The loss of OCO funds will require the Army to reallocate already reduced resources to fix, replace, and repair worn out equipment coming back from both locations. This will impact the current planned allocations in both the Organizational Maintenance Activity and procurement funding for future requirements.
What does all of this mean for strategy? We began this discussion with the observation that when resources are tight, they exert a more powerful influence on strategy. That story is playing out now. Given the dynamics of the resource allocation process discussed above, the Army is likely to choose to focus its operations towards CAM capabilities and force structure. The Army's ability to sustain capabilities inherent Once we break the 450 billion threshold, our ability to meet our national security objectives and effectively protect our country against all threat or contingencies would be appreciably and increasingly undermined.....As Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta said while testifying.....The nearly 500 billion in defense cuts already imposed are taking us to the edge. The military has a terrible record for discerning the future. The failings in our assessment of risk make the process of strategic forecasting even more challenging.
Understanding that the Army's future OE will be uncertain and ambiguous, that decisions on prioritization between CAM and WAS will occur. Knowing the Army will be confronted by budget reductions, manpower draw-downs, and training and resource challenges, what will increase (or at least maintain) the Army's capabilities? The Army needs to shorten the time required to adapt to future conflicts. The military needs to expand, create new capabilities and rapidly scale up in other areas. To counterbalance these challenges, the Army will need to leverage dynamic capabilities that make it a more adaptable and flexible force. In essence, it needs to learn to learn. In this section, we explore three areas where dynamic capabilities are particularly crucial: materiel, training, and doctrine.
Strategic uncertainty means that the key systems for a given fight are not wellunderstood in advance. Thus, the military needs an acquisitions system that accommodates new requirements from the OE and provides solutions rapidly and efficiently. Needless to say, this is a tall order. But we have seen some successes in the system (or, as the case may be, despite the system). An example of the Army's application of dynamic capabilities is responsiveness to an unknown operational need through the acquisition system. This is illustrated in the Army's need for a more The Army is looking towards a future that is uncertain, ambiguous and complex will not be able to procure and equip a ready force for every contingency. The military will also not have years of lead time to develop necessary capabilities. The service must have a ready system to respond when the OE around you is not what was expected, is in flux, and you need to adapt to it. The ability to leverage this dynamic capacity will allow the Army to quickly enter, and adapt to the environment, and procure the systems necessary to achieve mission success.
Another area where dynamic capabilities must be developed is in modifying or interactions, PRTs and joint patrols became the norm. Additionally, the JMRC allowed participating units and soldiers training to develop and enhance the necessary collective and individual skills required using similar techniques and resources. 61 Rapid changes in training allowed the Army to deploy units that were better prepared, organized, and properly equipped to execute the complex operations they would be asked to perform. Furthermore, this ability to quickly transition pre-deployment training was responsible for enhancing commanders and staffs cognitive abilities; the way they think, visualize and creatively solve problems, which lead to more successful operational execution in theater. Yet these achievements cost money. They cost time. They required the dedication of thousands of personnel over several years. Some senior leaders call this -investing in the schoolhouse.‖ It is how George Marshall prepared the Army for the coming war in Europe, despite extremely tight budgets. 62 Marshall invested in the part of the Army that would be able to train and develop a conscript force for the complexities of modern warfare. He built a cadre of officers who were masters of the operational art, but who were also dedicated to instilling that mastery in others. In many respects, this is the challenge we face today.
Conclusion
The current strategic emphasis in the Pacific theater will define, through Air
Force and Naval assets, the means by which the DoD executes support of the Defense Strategy as an element of national power. The Army is the major bill-payer, due to continued reductions to budgets, military end strength, longer acquisition and procurement timelines, and through assuming increased risk. How much of each of these changes the Army can accept without sacrificing readiness is further affected by a variety of biases, assumptions and assessment of risk that are intertwined in the decision making process. There are more unknowns than known, our track record in gauging the future is poor, and we will not have it right when the conflict starts.
The Military does not choose the wars we enter into. The Army is responsive to its civilian leaders, the policies established, and decisions they make. The Army cannot predict in 6 to 12 years (2018-2024) who that leader will be, the strategic policies implemented, and where they will commit the military. What complicates this further is that the Army requests resources to fulfill the directed strategy, but it cannot predict future strategy. Finally, the military has to be able to learn and adapt, but will only do so to the degree we are forced to and when we must.
The U.S. Military's success will hinge on the ability of which dynamic capabilities can be scaled up quickly and those that cannot. The Army will not develop the full context until they are actually engaged in the OE. Therefore, the Military must invest in learning and leveraging dynamic capabilities to remain pliable in future environments.
Doing so will help identify additional dynamic capabilities and create greater adaptability and flexibility in a system centered on processes. The Military's' ability to learn, grow
